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pear illogical not to find a continuity of treatment between two
treating physicians. s Therefore, it is submitted that the accrual of
a medical malpractice cause of action against any of a succession of
treating doctors, all of whom are employed by the same medical
professional service corporation, should not be deemed to occur
until the cessation of the plaintiff-patient's treatment.
Louis J. Ragusa

Article 30-Remedies and Pleading
CPLR 3017: Postverdict motion to amend ad damnum clause
should be granted in the absence of prejudice to defendant
CPLR 3017(a) empowers a court to grant any form of relief
that is appropriate to the proof, irrespective of whether the relief
to be granted was sought by the plaintiff. 8 Despite the broad
language of this provision, the courts repeatedly have declined to
exercise their authority to award money damages in excess of the
amount requested in the plaintiff's reliefs9 or "ad damnum"
clause.4 0 While the courts have granted preverdict motions to
N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976), imputation from one doctor to another is
more appropriate. Otherwise, a physician aware of his negligence might pursue futile corrective action or refer his patient to a fellow physician of the professional service corporation in
order to circumvent the statute of limitations. See County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith,
Inc., 78 Misc. 2d at 891, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
37 Notably, the underlying rationale of the continuous treatment doctrine, as promulgated in Borgia, is that "[i]t would be absurd to require a wronged patient to interrupt
corrective efforts by serving a summons on the physician or hospital superintendent." Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 156, 187 N.E.2d 777, 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321-22
(1962); see Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (N.D.N.Y. 1977);
Fonda v. Paulsen, 46 App. Div. 2d 540, 544, 363 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845 (3d Dep't 1975); 1
WK&M 214-a.03, at 2-319.
38 CPLR 3017(a) provides in part that "[e]xcept as provided in section 3215, the court
may grant any type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the proof whether or not
demanded, imposing such terms as may be just." CPLR 3017(a) (McKinney Supp. 19801981). CPLR 3017(a) requires the pleader to set forth the relief which he seeks. It does not
require the pleader to state the exact amount of damages sought, although this has become
standard practice. See Silvestris v. Silvestris, 24 App. Div. 2d 247, 250, 265 N.Y.S.2d 173,
178 (1st Dep't 1965); CPLR 3017(a), commentary at 11 (1974).
39 The claim for money damages contained in a complaint popularly is referred to as
the "ad damnum" clause. Vincent v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 75 Conn. 650, 55 A.
177, 179 (1903), rev'd on other grounds, 77 Conn. 281, 58 A. 963 (1904); see SIEGzL § 217.
10 E.g., Sponholz v. Stanislaus, 410 F. Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Michalowski v.
Ey, 7 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 163 N.E.2d 863, 865, 195 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 (1959); Litcom Div., Litton
Sys. Inc. v. Suffolk Roofing Co., 52 App. Div. 2d 593, 593-94, 382 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 (2d
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amend the ad damnum'clause when such action would not be prejudicial to the defendant,"' they routinely have denied postverdict
motions to amend, regardless of whether prejudice might ensue.42
Recently, however, in Loomis v. Civetta Corinno Construction
Corp.,43 the Court of Appeals held that in the absence of prejudice
to the defendant, a motion to amend the ad damnum clause, made
before or after the verdict, may be granted."
In Loomis, the plaintiff had commenced a property damage
action against the defendant construction company.45 In the ad
damnum clause of her complaint, the plaintiff assessed her damages at $ 1 5, 0 0 0 .4e At an assessment hearing conducted after the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment had been granted, the
plaintiff made two motions to increase the amount of damages requested in the ad damnum clause.47 The court denied the first moDep't 1976); Naujokas v. H. Frank Carey High School, 33 App. Div. 2d 703, 704, 306
N.Y.S.2d 195, 196 (2d Dep't 1969); see 3 WK&M
3017.06, at 30-371 (1980). "[CPLR
3017(a)] was not intended to annul or affect the existing cases which forbade a court from
granting monetary awards in excess of the amounts demanded by the complaint, unless a
proper amendment of the pleadings is first made." Garden Hill Estates, Inc. v. Bernstein, 24
App. Div. 2d 512, 512, 261 N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (2d Dep't 1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 525, 215
N.E.2d 163, 267 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1966).
41 E.g., Drechsel v. Loblaw, Inc., 64 App. Div. 2d 1022, 1023, 409 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468 (4th
Dep't 1978); Ceratto v. R.H. Crown Co., 58 App. Div. 2d 721, 721, 396 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (3d
Dep't 1977); Finn v. Crystal Beach Transit Co., 55 App. Div. 2d 1001, 1001, 391 N.Y.S.2d
925, 926 (4th Dep't 1977); Bird v. Board of Educ., 29 App. Div. 2d 812, 812, 286 N.Y.S.2d
888, 889 (3d Dep't 1968); Soulier v. Harrison, 21 App. Div. 2d 725, 725, 250 N.Y.S.2d 141,
142 (3d Dep't 1964); Natale v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 781, 781, 186
N.Y.S.2d 795, 796 (1st Dep't 1959).
42 Conforming the ad damnum clause to the jury verdict through use of a postverdict
motion has been held to be an "improvident exercise of discretion," Delgado v. Claudio, 47
App. Div. 2d 867, 868, 368 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1013 (1st Dep't 1975), constituting prejudice to
the defendant as "a matter of law." Wyman v. Morone, 33 App. Div. 2d 168, 170, 306
N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 (3d Dep't 1969). Moreover, the courts consistently have refused to allow a
jury verdict to stand if it is greater than the amount of the ad damnum clause. See, e.g.,
Zayas v. Lux Serv. Corp., 47 App. Div. 2d 867, 868, 368 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1015 (1st Dep't
1975); Naujokas v. H. Frank Carey High School, 33 App. Div. 2d 703, 704, 306 N.Y.S.2d 195,
196 (2d Dep't 1969). At least one lower court, however, has granted a postverdict motion to
amend the ad damnum clause in'accordance with the jury's verdict. Douglas v. Latona, 61
Misc. 2d 859, 864, 306 N.Y.S.2d 992, 999 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1970).
43 54 N.Y.2d 18, 429 N.E.2d 90, 444 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1981).
14 Id. at 23, 429 N.E.2d at 92, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
45 Id. at 20-21, 429 N.E.2d at 90, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 571. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had "entered upon her rear yard in 1976 and removed her patio, a brick wall and
certain shrubbery in connection with its construction of a luxury high rise apartment building on the adjacent property." Id. at 20-21, 429 N.E.2d at 90, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
46 Id.
47 Id. Prior to the assessment hearing, the plaintiff's attorneys notified the defendant
that the plaintiff's total damages were about $23,000. Id., 429 N.E.2d at 90, 444 N.Y.S.2d at
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tion on the basis of "surprise,'48 and reserved decision on the second motion. 49 Thereafter, implicitly granting the plaintiff's second
motion, the court awarded the plaintiff a judgment of $26,118.50
The Appellate Division, First Department, modified the award to
conform to the amount demanded in the plaintiff's ad damnum
clause, holding that although the court may grant an amendment
to the pleadings "at any time," postverdict amendments to the ad
damnum clause are impermissible.5
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.5 2 Judge Gabrielli,
writing for a unanimous Court, 53 noted two rationale which had
been proffered in support of the blanket prohibition against postverdict amendments to the ad damnum clause.5 4 The Court observed that a defendant who believed that his maximum liability
was limited to the amount specified in an ad damnum clause might
either rely upon counsel paid for by an insurance company 5 or be
"lull[ed] . . . into a false sense of security.""" Judge Gabrielli reasoned that these problems arise infrequently and provide insufficient justification for a broad prohibition against postverdict ad
damnum clause amendments.57 Focusing, instead, upon the stated
objective of the CPLR to liberalize pleadings5 8 and upon the clear
571. In addition, the defendant's expert was permitted to inspect the plaintiff's property
and question the plaintiff and her attorneys regarding the alleged damages. Id., 429 N.E.2d
at 90, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
48 Loomis v. Civetta Corinno Constr. Corp., 78 App. Div. 2d 845, 845, 433 N.Y.S.2d 156,
156 (1st Dep't 1980), rev'd, 54 N.Y.2d 18, 429 N.E.2d 90, 444 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1981).
'9 54 N.Y.2d at 21, 429 N.E.2d at 90, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 571. The Court noted that while
special term did not clearly respond to the plaintiff's second motion, it was apparent that it
had reserved its decision. Id., 429 N.E.2d at 90, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
50 78 App. Div. 2d at 845, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 156. The Appellate Division noted that by
entering judgment in an amount higher than that demanded, the trial court had granted
plaintiff's second motion to amend. Id.
-- Id. at 845, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 156-57.
52 54 N.Y.2d at 24, 429 N.E.2d at 92, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
53 Judge Gabrielli was joined by Chief Judge Cooke, and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler,
Meyer, and Fuchsberg.
5, 54 N.Y.2d at 22, 429 N.E.2d at 91, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
55 Id.

5I Id.
57 Id.

58 Id. at 23, 429 N.E.2d at 91, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 572. See SIEGEL § 217. The CPLR is to
"be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
civil judicial proceeding." CPLR 104 (1972). This section is designed to make a "sharp
cleavage" with the rigid formality of common-law pleadings. CPLR 104, commentary at 36
(1972). Thus, liberal amendment of pleadings is authorized unless such amendment would
prejudice the opposing party. Fahey v. Ontario County, 44 N.Y.2d 934, 935, 380 N.E.2d 146,
147, 408 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (1978); Karras v. Westchester County, 71 App. Div. 2d 878, 878,
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language of CPLR 3017 and CPLR 3025,19 the Court concluded
that in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, a motion to
amend the ad damnum clause may be granted even if it is made
after trial.6 0 Since, in the instant case, the defendant was unable to
indicate any significant prejudice, the Court held that Special
Term did not abuse its discretion by entering judgment in excess
of the amount originally set forth in the ad damnum clause.61
It is evident that the Loomis Court, by identifying "prejudice"
as the dispositive factor in determining whether to grant a motion
to amend the ad damnum clause," has eliminated the traditional
distinction between motions to amend made prior to a verdict and
419 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655 (2d Dep't 1979).
" Loomis v. Civetta Corinno Constr. Corp., 54 N.Y.2d at 23, 429 N.E.2d at 91, 444
N.Y.S.2d at 572. A motion under CPLR 3017(a) to increase the ad damnum clause after the
verdict has been rendered is technically made under CPLR 3025(c), which provides that
"[t]he court may permit pleadings to be amended before or after judgment to conform them
to the evidence, upon such terms as may be just." CPLR 3025(c) (McKinney Supp. 19801981). The Loomis Court observed that the unambiguous language of CPLR 3017(a) and
CPLR 3025(c) clearly evinces that it is within the sound discretion of a court to allow a
postverdict amendment to the ad damnum clause and to award an amount greater than that
originally sought. 54 N.Y.2d at 23, 429 N.E.2d at 91, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
60 Id., 429 N.E.2d at 92, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
81 Id. at 24, 429 N.E.2d at 92, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 573. The Loomis Court noted that
merely subjecting a defendant to increased liability is not prejudicial. Id. at 23, 429 N.E.2d
at 92, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 573. Rather, a finding of prejudice involves a showing that the defendant was hampered in preparing his case or the defendant neglected to take some measure
in his defense due to his reliance upon the amount originally demanded in the ad damnum
clause. Id. The Loomis Court observed that the defendant was notified of the greater damages several months prior to the hearing. Id. at 24, 429 N.E.2d at 92, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
Moreover, noted the Court, the defendant's expert was permitted to inspect all of the property which had been damaged. Id. Finally, the Court observed that the defendant was unable to point to any real prejudice accompanying the increase in the amount of damages
specified in the ad damnum clause. Id.
12 Id. Prejudice has been defined as a form of detrimental reliance whereby the defendant has abstained from taking action to support his case adequately. Wyman v. Morone, 33
App. Div. 2d 168, 172, 306 N.Y.S.2d 115, 119 (3d Dep't 1969) (Cooke, J., dissenting); see
Burden v. Cadillac Developers Massapequa Corp., 34 Misc. 2d 37, 38, 227 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 19 App. Div. 2d 716, 242 N.Y.S.2d
425 (2d Dep't 1963), aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 523, 197 N.E.2d 628, 248 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1964); 3
WK&M 1 3025.15, at 30-594 to 30-596 (1980). The absence or presence of prejudice has been
viewed as a significant factor in determining whether to grant a motion to amend the ad
damnum clause. See Barner v. Shook, 51 App. Div. 2d 855, 855, 379 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566 (4th
Dep't 1976) (amendment granted since opposing party was unable to show prejudice); Vitiello v. Consolidated Edison Co., 51 App. Div. 2d 523, 523, 379 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (1st Dep't
1976) (motion to increase amount of damages specified in ad damnum clause denied due to
possible prejudice to defendant). But see note 69 and accompanying text infra (prejudice
not a factor under federal law).
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those made after a verdict." Moreover, it is suggested that although Loomis arose in a postverdict context, it will have the beneficial effect of reconciling the discordant case law surrounding
preverdict ad damnum clause amendments." Notably, although
several cases have held that delay absent prejudice to the defendant is not a sufficient ground for denial of motion to amend the
ad damnum clause made before or during trial, 5 other cases have
63

See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra. Notably, the Loomis decision was

foreshadowed in W.T. Grant Co. v. Srogi, 52 N.Y.2d 496, 420 N.E.2d 953, 438 N.Y.S.2d 761
(1981), a proceeding to review tax assessments. The Grant Court reversed its prior position
in People ex rel. Interstate Land Holding Co. v. Purdy, 206 App. Div. 606, 198 N.Y.S. 940
(lst Dep't), aff'd, 236 N.Y. 609, 142 N.E. 303 (1923), and held that relief in a tax review
proceeding should not be limited to the sum demanded in the petition. 52 N.Y.2d at 512-13,
420 N.E.2d at 960-61, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 768-69. Although disclaiming any consideration of
this rule in an ordinary civil case, id. at 513 n.2, 420 N.E.2d at 961 n.2, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 769
n.2, the Court reasoned that the granting of appropriate relief should not be defeated by a
"pleading technicality." Id. at 513, 420 N.E.2d at 960, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 768. Noting that
since the taxing authority had adequate notice, and no prejudice had been alleged or
proven, the Court concluded that "[there was] no good reason to adhere blindly to a rule
which precludes a court from granting the relief justified by the proof." Id. at 513, 420
N.E.2d at 961, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 769. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Gabrielli found little to
distinguish the application of the rule in a tax context from that of an ordinary civil case, id.
at 519, 420 N.E.2d at 964, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 772 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting), and no compelling
reason to reverse the rule as a mere "pleading technicality." Id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
The dissent noted that the holding would inject uncertainty into the budgetary decisions of
the municipality because the municipality would be unable to determine the amount of
money available for essential services if the amount of revenue from local property taxes
could not be clearly ascertained. Id. at 521, 420 N.E.2d at 965, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 773
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting). Indeed, Judge Gabrielli observed a "disturbing tendency" within
the courts to "brush aside well-settled rules of law when application of the rules would not
produce the desired result." Id. at 520 n.*, 420 N.E.2d at 965 n.*, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 773
n.*(Gabrielli, J., dissenting). Citing to the principle of stare decisis, Judge Gabrielli admonished the majority, stating that the "re-examination of existing precedent" should be undertaken only "with the greatest caution" in order to avoid "jurisprudential scandal." Id. at
520-21 n.*, 420 N.E.2d at 965 n.*, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 773 n.* (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, only 7 months later, Judge Gabrielli precipitated the demise of the heretofore "wellsettled" rule of law, prohibiting postverdict amendments to the ad dannum clause. See
Loomis v. Civetta Corinno Constr. Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 18, 23, 429 N.E.2d 90, 92, 444 N.Y.S.2d
571, 573 (1981).
" See notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text infra. One commentator has observed that
the liberality with which motions to amend the ad damnum clause are granted shifts from
department to department. CPLR 3025, commentary at 485-86 (1974).
615E.g., Finn v. Crystal Beach Transit Co., 55 App. Div. 2d 1001, 1001, 391 N.Y.S.2d
925, 926 (4th Dep't 1977); Taggart v. United States Lines, Inc., 53 App. Div. 2d 569, 570, 384
N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (1st Dep't 1976); Ryan v. Collins, 33 App. Div. 2d 966, 966, 306 N.Y.S.2d
777, 779 (3d Dep't 1970); Smith v. University of Rochester Medical Center, 32 App. Div. 2d
736, 736-37, 301 N.Y.S.2d 933, 934 (4th Dep't 1969); Bird v. Board of Educ., 29 App. Div. 2d
812, 812, 286 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (3d Dep't 1968); Calautti v. National Transp. Co., 10 App.
Div. 2d 955, 955, 201 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (2d Dep't 1960).
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held that unjustifiable delay is a sufficient basis for denying such a
motion. 8 The latter cases also mandate that the cause for delay be
established before prejudice to the defendant may be assessed. 7 It
is submitted that the Loomis decision, by shifting judicial attention to the prejudice visited upon the defendant, effectively has
eliminated the element of delay as a significant factor in determining whether to grant a motion to amend the ad damnum clause. 8
Of course, it is arguable whether retention of the prejudice bar
itself is warranted. Federal case law permits a judgment to be conformed to the verdict irrespective of prejudice to the defendant."
Moreover, New York statutory law does not appear to mandate the
prejudice check adopted by the New York judiciary.70 In addition,
66 E.g., Harris v. Pullman's Bar & Grill, Inc., 74 App. Div. 2d 818, 819, 425 N.Y.S.2d

355, 356 (2d Dep't 1980) (extended and unjustified delay in amending the ad damnum
clause requires that motion be denied); Luongo v. Hollander Assocs., 54 App. Div. 2d 858,
858, 388 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (1st Dep't 1976) (in a personal injury case, an affidavit showing
merits of the case and reasons to justify delay must be presented or motion to amend the ad
damnum clause will be denied); Boehm Dev. Corp. v. New York, 42 App. Div. 2d 1018, 1018,
348 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (3d Dep't 1973) (since the plaintiff failed to explain "inordinate delay" in supporting affidavits, motion to amend the ad damnum clause must be denied); Osborne v. Miller, 38 App. Div. 2d 298, 300, 328 N.Y.S.2d 769, 771 (1st Dep't 1972) (when
supporting affidavit does not allege injuries "recently ... [coming] to the attention of the
plaintiff," motion to amend the ad damnum clause must be denied).
67 See Peterson v. Spartan Indus., Inc., 64 App. Div. 2d 958, 959, 408 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795
(1st Dep't 1978); Kind v. Rose Serebreny Corp., 28 App. Div. 2d 988, 988, 283 N.Y.S.2d 889,
889 (1st Dep't 1967); Jimenez v. Seickel & Sons, 22 App. Div. 2d 643, 643, 252 N.Y.S.2d 891,
892 (1st Dep't 1964); note 66 supra.
6s The Loomis Court's emphasis upon prejudice, rather than upon delay, is reminiscent
of Judge Cooke's dissent in Wyman v. Morone, 33 App. Div. 2d 168, 171-75, 306 N.Y.S.2d
115, 118-22 (3d Dep't 1969). In response to a finding by the majority of prejudice "as a
matter of law," id. at 170, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 117, the dissent in Wyman argued that the
defendant had not indicated any inability to prepare his case adequately or any reliance
upon the amount in the original ad damnum clause, id. at 172, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 119 (Cooke,
J., dissenting). The dissent contended that the "legislatively stated policy of liberality
should be observed so long as there is no real prejudice to an adversary." Id. (Cooke, J.,
dissenting).
69 E.g., Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d 21, 24 (8th Cir. 1980); Riggs, Ferris & Geer
v. Lillibridge, 316 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1963); Roorda v. American Oil Co., 446 F. Supp. 939,
948 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); see FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c) ("final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings").
70 Given that CPLR 3017(a) does not require accurate specification of damages in an ad
damnum clause, see note 38 supra, and that CPLR 3017(c) expressly prohibits the pleader
from indicating any amount in the ad damnum clause in a medical malpractice action,
CPLR 3017(c) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981), it would appear illogical to conclude that the
legislature intended to permit defendants to rely upon the statement of damages contained
in an ad damnum clause. Of course, absent reliance by a defendant upon an ad damnum
clause, an amendment of such clause cannot be prejudicial.
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both state and federal courts have asserted that the ad damnum
clause exists solely to enable courts to assess whether they have
jurisdiction over particular matters.71 Consequently, the legitimacy
of the prejudice bar to ad damnum clause amendments clearly is
suspect.
Notably, the Loomis decision did not address the issue
whether, absent a motion by the plaintiff, a court may act sua
sponte to award more damages than requested in the ad damnum
clause. The federal courts consistently have conformed judgments
to verdicts in the absence of motions to amend. 2 Moreover, the
explicit language of CPLR 3017(a) would seem to compel similar
action by the New York courts.7 3 Nevertheless, because the Loomis
Court did not resolve this question, it is suggested that counsel for
the plaintiff would be well-advised to move to amend the ad
damnum clause to conform to the verdict, and not rely upon a
court to act sua sponte.
Steven M. Rapp
DEVELOPMENTS IN
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Fellow servant rule held an inadmissible defense to an employee's
action against his employer for injuries sustained due to the negligence of a coemployee
71

One federal court has noted that the ad dannum clause is "totally irrelevant" to the

amount of money damages which a plaintiff may be awarded. Zuckerman v. Tatarian, 418
F.2d 878, 880 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1069 (1970). Indeed, the significance of
the ad damnum clause has been addressed persuasively:
The purpose of the ad damnum is only to establish jurisdiction. It has no bearing
on what should be awarded to the plaintiff by the verdict.... [I]t is immaterial
what the plaintiff thinks he should be awarded. It is immaterial what the defendant thinks should be awarded to the plaintiff.
Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 28 F.R.D. 315, 318 (M.D. Pa. 1961) (quoting AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSA-

163, 179-81 (1959)). The singular jurisdictional significance of the ad damnum
clause also has been noted by several New York courts. "[T]he ad damnum clause has no
other relevance or probative weight ...
except to confirm that plaintiff has in fact chosen
the proper court, in a jurisdictional sense, to determine his action." Gold v. Huntington
Town House, 64 App. Div. 2d 885, 887, 407 N.Y.S.2d 907, 909 (2d Dep't 1978) (Suozzi, J.,
dissenting).
72 E.g., Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d 21, 24 (8th Cir. 1980); Southwestern Inv.
Co. v. Cactus Motor Co., 355 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Bachman
& Keffer Constr. Co. v. H.G. Cozad Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 617, 620 (10th Cir. 1963); Riggs,
Ferris & Geer v. Lillibridge, 316 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1963).
73 See CPLR 3017(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); note 38 supra.
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